

Safety and Health Programs, OSHA, shall furnish guidelines to field councils concerning the preparation of this report.

(d) Upon determination that a council is not operating in accordance with its charter and the provisions of this subpart, and after consultation with appropriate OSHA regional officials, the Secretary shall revoke the council's charter. Upon revocation of a charter, the council shall surrender all its government property to the appropriate OSHA regional official. Any continuing or future organization in the same geographical area shall not use the title Field Federal Safety and Health Council, or any derivation thereof, unless formally rechartered by the Secretary. Notification of revocation of a council's charter shall be sent to the chairperson, where identifiable, and to the appropriate OSHA Regional Office.

PART 1975—COVERAGE OF EMPLOYERS UNDER THE WILLIAMS-STEIGER OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970

Sec.

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AUTHORITY: Secs. 2, 3, 4, 8, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651, 652, 653, 657); Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754).

SOURCE: 37 FR 929, Jan. 21, 1972, unless otherwise noted.

§ 1975.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) Among other things, the Williams-Steiger Act poses certain duties on employers. This part has the limited purpose and scope of clarifying which persons are considered to be employers either as a matter of interpretation of the intent and terms of the Act or as a matter of policy appropriate to administering and enforcing the Act. In short, the purpose and scope of this part is to indicate which persons are

covered by the Act as employers and, as such, subject to the requirements of the Act.

(b) It is not the purpose of this part to indicate the legal effect of the Act, once coverage is determined. Section 4(b)(1) of the Act provides that the statute shall be inapplicable to working conditions to the extent they are subject to another Federal agency's exercise of different statutory authority affecting the occupational safety and health aspects of those conditions. Therefore, a person may be considered an employer covered by the Act, and yet standards issued under the Act respecting certain working conditions would not be applicable to the extent those conditions were subject to another agency's authority.

§ 1975.2 Basis of authority.

The power of Congress to regulate employment conditions under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, is derived mainly from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. (section 2(b), Pub. L. 91-596; U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3; "United States v. Darby," 312 U.S. 100.) The reach of the Commerce Clause extends beyond Federal regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce so as to empower Congress to regulate conditions or activities which affect commerce even though the activity or condition may itself not be commerce and may be purely intrastate in character. ("Gibbons v. Ogden," 9 Wheat. 1, 195; "United States v. Darby," supra; "Wickard v. Filburn," 317 U.S. 111, 117; and "Perez v. United States," 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971).) And it is not necessary to prove that any particular intrastate activity affects commerce, if the activity is included in a class of activities which Congress intended to regulate because the class affects commerce. ("Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States," 379 U.S. 241; "Katzenbach v. McClung," 379 U.S. 294; and "Perez v. United States," supra.) Generally speaking, the class of activities which Congress may regulate under the commerce power may be as broad and as inclusive as Congress intends, since the commerce power is plenary and has no restrictions placed on it except specific